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Risk. whether market

political. is

important tletermintmt ofprivatc investment decicontrol by the government. is the risk associated with
the hold-up problem: governments can Force utilities to shoulcler burdensome taxes. to use
input factors inefFectively. or to charge unprol-itahle rates for their service. To attract private
investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropria-tivc (either to contracts that gtlarantee very high rates ofreturn or to favorable regulatory
policies). These commitments. ol‘ course. must be credible.
judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatory policies are based upon two
)0u‘?1i.I'.f.{'t'(-’l'lEICl'0|'Sl regulatory predictahility and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory |1roees.s. in Wl‘llI.‘l1 prices .'l.I'Itl levels (Ii-SCl'\'iL'{.' are .-icl. is not '.1I'l>lll".ll'}'.
ii‘ the CtJI1(lltltJl‘I oil rcgt1l'.ttoI'y pI'l.'.‘LllI.‘[i!.lJllll_\’ llolds. then in\*c.|-tot‘.-e L'.lI1 ll.}I'L‘t.I.l!sl their returns
over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. It‘ there is regime stability.
then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the
industry—--the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights. or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are. in turn. important
determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control. reversion-ary regulatory policy. and
veto gates. Moreover. regime stability is also. in part. a function of these three characteristics.
We ex-.1rnine our theory of political rislt and regulatory commitment hy comparing the cases
of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.
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1. Introduction

policies that

F.eonoInic development and long-term capital investment go hand in hand.
Public utilities. such as power and commttnicatiotts, are particularly important in the relationship between development and investment: not only do
utilities themselves require major capital inputs, but they are l‘ut1dan1ental
building blocks For economic tleveloprnent. Studying utilities can tl1et'elb1‘e
provide key insights into economic development.
Utilities, as attractive and potent tools for redistribution, are particularly
vulnerable to political winds. Political interference in production and pricing of‘ utility services tends to be inefi cient, as economic criteria often are
low on the list oFconsiLlt.'l".1tiol1s For political decisions.' Politically motivatetl redistributive ei‘l*'ort's often drive away sources of long-term capital
investment and hence seriously impede economic development.
The clash of‘ political exigency and economic efficiency gives rise to a
conundrum. On the one hand, governments are central to utility development. \\’/ithout them, vital investments might never be made. On the
other hand. government creates inefficiencies in two ways. First, they put
up capital that the ma1'ket might not otherwise provide. While this may

bring about signil'icant political returns For government, the market returns
often nil. Second and more importantly, they shield basic investment
and pricing decisions From I'l1Zll‘l(C[ forces and open them up to political
are

forces:

'

Risk. whether market or political, is an important determinant of private
investmetlt decisions. The greater the risk, all else constant, the lower the
level ol" private investment (World Bank 1995; Levy and Spiller 1996).
(iovernments can. however, increase the level of private investment by re-

ducing the political risks associated with capiral—intensive industries. These
political rislts are well known and a1'e referred to as the “hold up" problem:
governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input
factors inel-Tectively, or to charge unpro table rates For their service. More—
over, due to the capital intensivity of utility production, exit is often difficult, and thus goveritinents can pursue strategies that depreciate the asset
value or the investment. essentially expropriating the capital through regu-

lation (\Williamson 1983).
Wliile the hold up problem may deter investment, governments typically
do not wish to allow utilities to act as unrestrained monopolies. Thus,
governments often seek to define a middle course.'5 But, political whims are
seemingly arbitrary and often seemingly capricious. To attract private invest—
mcnt in the First place, governments mI.1st.be able to make commitments to
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are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very
ofrerurn or to Favorable regulatory policies) on the one hand, and
nonmonopolistic on the other. These commitments. oli course, must be
credible in the eyes of prospective investors (North and \X/eingast 1989.
North 1990. Levy and Spiller 1996).Judgments about the credibility t'Jl'iCOI1'll‘11itI'l1L"l1l'S to regulatory policies are
based upon two poilirirrri’ liictots: regulatory predictability and regirne stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which
prices and levels or service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of
regulatory predictability holds, then investors can Forecast their returns over
time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime
stability. then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the_
government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being
the denial of property rights, or expropriation.4 IF either of: these two conditions are not met. then the apparent risk imposed by political circumstances is likely to lead investors to doubt the credibility of a regulatory
commitment and thus will discourage private investment.
.
We will argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are important determinants of regulatory predictability: assignment of agenda
control over regulatory policy changes, the de nition of the reversionary
regulatory policy {i.e.. the policy that obtains in the absence of policy
change), and the number of veto gates (i.e., places in the process at which
the holder of the gate can reject "policy changes) in the regulatory process.
First, iF:t veto player with a stake in the reversion has agenda control, then
an investor can take comfort in the expectation of an ex rmte veto. Second,
the more extreme" the 1'eversionary policy. all else constant, the more likely
is policy change; conversely, if the reversion constitutes some veto player’s
ideal policy, then policy change under normal circumstances is highly unlikely. With respect to the third chat'actct'istic, the more players there are
who can veto proposed changes to existing policy, the more likely it is that
the current policy will be stable. This observation hinges on an important
premise: policy will change, under legal processes, only when there exists
some alternative policy that all veto players prefer to the reversionary policy.
The likelihood of policy change, in turn. constitutes an important component of risk to investors, with more unstable policies posing the greatest risk,
all else constant.
Regime stability is an equally important determinant of political risk.
Even when the regulatory process is stable and predictable, and returns to
the industry are sufficient for the predicted level of regulatory risk, the
political risk involved with changes in government or changes in the goals of
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government may greatly increase

the rislt of any investment. The increase in
risk arises because changes in government or changes in the goals of an
existing goverlilnelit could generate unpredictable changes in the regulatory
regime itselli Investors must calculate the likelihood that :1 new government
would change the system of regulation. Then, investors must consider the
level of authority that re.gttlatot‘s' in the new system migl1t possess, as well as
whether regulators in the new system are likely to Favor investors with large
stink costs in capital investment.
We proct-eel as Follows. In the next section. we brie y review the relationship between regulation and incentives for investment. In sections th1'ee and
liiur. we argue that incentives within the regulatory structure For private
investment are not credible unless they are nested in a political context that
maltes them durable. Our argument hinges on the role of political institutions in protecting the status quo policy. in section ve, we briefly consider
the importance of regime stability for credible commitment to regulatory
structure. In section six, we then look at electricity regulation in its political
and institutional context, in Argentina and Chile. Wliile we nd eihciettt
and apparently similar regulatory I"ran'1ewot‘lt.-5 in both countries, they came
about through very tliFl*i::'c1it political circumstances and regulatory mechanisms (lor a detailed description of policies to promote competition ‘in both
countries, see Hogan 1996). Section seven concludes.
2. Regulation and Investment
The Capital Asset Pricing Model implies that investment will be determined, in part, by the risks associated with the investment.“ The higher the
risk. the higher the expected return must be to generate the same level of
investment. all else const:tnt. The flip side is, if the rate of return is to he
ltept below some extortionary maximum, then the risks must he reduced as

well. all else constant.
Investors in public utilities know there is a substantial amount of political
risk associated with their investment. Political considerations may lead regulators to “hold up" the utility by setting prices in the short run below the
utilityis long run marginal cost (W/illiamson 1983). \X/hat ntalces this possible is the fact that two-thirds of :1 utility’s costs are, on average. capital
costs. anti thus setting prices too low in the short rttn will not cause the
utility to go bankrupt; however, this will eventually wipe out the utility’s
investment as its capital is depreciated. This will make the utility worthless.

Mal

In order

to encourage investment, at government must be able to commit
sttf cietitly high rate of‘ return, or to limiting both regulatory uncertainty and regime t'isk.7 Either commitment. iFct‘edil)le. allows investors to
better predict the rate of return they expect from their investment. With
respect to regulatory uncertainty and regime risk, such commitment is most
credible ii‘ the government is “Ct)l‘l.'s'l'l':Ill]CLl to obey :1 Set of‘. rules that do not
permit leeway for violating commitnients" (North and \X/eingast i989. 804:
see also, \X/illiamson 1985, 48-49; Milgrom, North, and \X/eingast 1990;
Root 1994: Levy and Spiller I996). The greater the uncertainty, all else
constant, the less long-term capital investment will accrue.
Levy and Spiller (I994, 207) point out that executive and legislative
discretion is often inversely correlated with credibility.“ For Levy and Spiller,
a strong and independent judiciary can constrain both of these hranclies oF
government. If independent justices are willing to decide against the government, then the courts can brake government action. In essence, courts
that can and will check actions taken by other branches of govcrnment——
i.e., courts that have a veto on policy—-can enhance the credibility of government commitmenr to “regulatory governance."
It is often the case, however. that courts are not independent of the
executive and the legislature; within certain political systems, it is impossible
to create independent courts. The issue, we think, is not really the courts per
se, but rather how easy it is to change regulatory structures and procedure.
In order to understand investtnent and regulatory decisions, tlterefore. it is
necessary to examine regulatory structures on the one hand, and the possibility that the regulatory structures will themselves be overturned o1' ig-

to :1

nored, on the other.

3. Institutional Determinants Of Regulatory Predictability: Veto

Gates, Rcversionary Policy, And Agenda Control
A necessary condition for policy olimrge is that policy makers prefer some
policy other than the status quo. There are a number of reasons why changing policies might become attractive. A new government might come to
power, reflecting new (or hitherto ignored) demands and priorities: better
information might become available to policy makers (via generational replacement or new advisory teams. For example) that supports more efficient
alternative policies; policy makers might want to adjust policy in response to
extragovernmental pressures, as from interest groups or rival political par-
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ties: or technology may develop so as to render old regulatory structures
irrelevant or even harmful. Each of these possibilities carries the danger that
policy change will retlttce the return to investors with sunk costs in the

alifccted intlustries.
Commitment to regulations and, hence. reduction of political risk, requires a commitment to a particular regulatory structure and procedure so
that it is difficult for the government to change regulations weir aj‘-policy
.r3|!f.f(r)I!.*(’J' me .ct.'}'5rrzi‘rr*/‘iii’ to it. Specifically, there are three features of the process that investors can consider‘ i11 order to predict the consequences of their
actions and thtts to make reasoned investments.
Iiirst. investors can identify who holds veto power over policy change. In
the United States, for example, utilities hold an ex (trite veto in that they
control the proposal power to change rates. Public utilities comnlissions can
veto proposed cltanges. Ifany veto player has a stake in current policy, then
the status quo will endure, thereby protecting the expected return on investments. This assumes that the 1'evetsionary outcome—-—the result of failing
to propose or to enact new policy—~—-is the status quo. The reversionary
outcome is. therefore. a second key vat'iable that potential investors must
consider. In the United States, for example, the reversionary outcome is the
existing rate structure and service schedule. Finally, an investor would be
wise to consider the agenda setters, who dictate whether and what proposed
changes will be considered. In Chile, for example, it is the regulatory agency
that proposes changes to the existing policy. We will discuss the dynamics of
each of these elements of the poIicy—n1aking process in turn.
A common approach to instituting a cornrnitment is to increase the numher of veto players with authority to block policy changes. A political process that increases the number of veto players, while making no other
clitliiges, will be more biased toward maintaining reversionary policy.”
Hence. government commitment to stable policy or process is easier in
prcsitlential, bicameral-legislative (where the chambers have equal powers),
and federal Cl')I1.'5El|IL1ti0l'1:ll systems, as well as multiparty systems where no
single party controls a majority of legislative seats, for it1 each case we see a
multiplicity of veto players.
The .='t‘t;r=r5r'artrrij* r.=ttr::ome is the outcome to which policy reverts if no new
proposal is passctl. Often, the rcvct'sionary outcome is the status quo; but,
this need not be the case, as illustrated by policies that are subject to sunset
provisions. Under such policies, the reversionary outcome is not the status
quo. but rather the eventual cessation of existing policy. Federal spending in
the U.S. for the Department of Education, for example, reverts to $0 in the
absence of new appropriations for it in the annual budget. Witlt regard to
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regulatory policy. a reversionary outcome could include a sunset provision
that calls for deregulation via termination of the relevant regulatory agency.
The L‘tlInl‘IiIl;lT.iUI1 of agenda control. veto power, and revcrsiontuy outcome affects the stability of regulatory policy. Thus, the level of private
investment in utilities is, at least partially. -.1 Function of these three institutional li:atut‘es.

4. Modeling Policy Making
To evaluate how the reversionary outcome determines the equilibrium
policy. it is useful to employ a simple spatial analogy. Hc1'c, we adopt the
method used by Hotclling (1929), as we assume that players have ideal
points along a unidimensional policy space. From models like these, we can
easily derive equilibria for various agenda structures where the agenda structure captures the key elements of the regulatory process. Prospective investors can use the implications of these spatial models to evaluate how well
their investment will be protected.
First, let us consider a simple agenda structure where agenda control is
granted to the regulator and the utility does not have a veto over changes
from the 1'eversion, Q. Under this scenario (and making the usual spatial-

modeling assumptions about preferences,l0 most importantly that players
have single-peaked preferences), the regulator would pick its ideal point, R,
as shown in Figure 1(a). In this gure, the utility with ideal point Iprefers
the regulator's proposed policy change to the reversion (for ll-Rl < II-Ql].
The result ofthis process need not profit the utility, however, as can be seen
in the situation depicted in Figure l(b). In this case, the utility is left
worse—off by the regulator's proposal (because ll-Ql < ll-RI).
Next, consider a slight variation of this agenda, where the utility is
granted a veto over changes to the reversion policy. Under this regulatory
process, the utility has a much better chance to protect its interests. For
example, reconsider Figure l(b), where y is a point such that Ino longer
prefers to retain Q (but Iprefers Q to y + E). Given these preferences and
an agenda that allows the utility to veto policy change, the regulator would
offer the utility a proposal at y. The regulator selects y becattse it is its best
strategy in anticipation of the utility's veto power. If the regulator were to
select a point to the right of y (such as y + 6). then the utility would no
longer be indifferent but would instead prefer the reversionary outcome Q
to the proposed change.” This would make the regulator worse off, as it
would get Q instead of y, which it prefers. Thus, by changing the regulatory
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rium outcome is I because the utility would propose its ideal point, which
the regulator prefers to Q (because R-ll < lR—Q|). The new policy. I,
makes both players better off.
The notion of vetoing a policy proposal implies that there is some other
policy the reversionary policy—that is preferred. The reversionary policy
can limit the number of feasible choices, as when it divides veto players or
when it is itself the most preferred policy of at least one veto player. Wlien
it is relatively more extreme, by contrast-———that is, as it becomes more
likely that all veto players (and, of course, whoever has proposal power)
will agree on some alternative to it—the reversion becomes less important
to policy outcomes. The mo1'e extreme the reversion, therefore, the less
rest1'icted is the range of alternatives that can be produced by the regulatory process.

analyze regulatory policy, we must look not only at regulatory
incentives but also at the authority and preferences of regulators. the ease of
changing regtilatory processes, and rcversionary policy. Further, especially in
light of the past experience of many low— and middle-income countries, we
should consider what happens when key players are denied a veto. Formal
vetoes mean little when they are unbalanced—controllcd by one or more
players with identical preferences. Where veto gates are few or unbalanced
and exclude important actors such as the military, we must consider also the
specter and consequences of dissatisfaction, not only with regulatory outcomes and process, but also with the entire political structure.
In order

proI:ess. in granting the utility a veto, policy moves from R to y and the
utility is made better off.
In Figure l{c), the reversion point lies between the utility and the regulator. Tlnls, there is no proposal that makes both the regulator and the
utility better off than the reversion. Let 2 be the point Q — 6. So, for
example, if the regulator proposes 1. then the utility will veto the ‘proposal
hecause ll-Ql < l—zl. Let w be the point at Q + E. Although the utility
would approve w, the regulator would not propose it under this agenda
structure because it would be worse off than it is at the reversion (lQ"Rl
<;
lw- RI}. Thus, the equilibrium outcome for Figure 1(c}, given the simple
agenda structure heI'e, is the reversion.
W-’lIeI1 the utility has veto authority, it prefers the outcomes in Figure l(h)
and Figure l(c), because they are closer to its ideal point, I. Also, in the case
of Figure llb), as the reversion approaches l. moving from Q to Q", for
exalnple, the equilibrium outcome moves closer to Ias well (from y to y" in
the figure}. the1'eby increasing the utility's ability to infiuence the out-.

t:oI'ne.l"

liirlally, consider the agenda structu1'e where the utility initiates changes to
the regulatory policy. and the regulator has a veto. in this case. given the
scenario of liigtire 1(a). the utilityls best strategy is to select it, where x is :1
point such tl1at R no longer prefers
The utility selects it for the same
reasons that the regulator. tlntler parallel conditions, selects y in Figure llbl.
The equilibrium outcome in Figure 1(a), when the utility is the agenda
setter and the regulator has :1 veto, is x. The reason why it is the equilibrium
outcome is because the regulator prefers x to Q (for lR—xl < lR**Q_I) and
will therefore accept the utility's pI'oposed change, x. In Figure 1(b), the
saint: tlgetitia structtII‘e leads to an equilibrium outcome at l.",’ The equilib-
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5-. The Determinants Of Regime Stability
The determinants of regime stability are unity of purpose and separation of
powers (Cox and McCubbins 1996). lf there is a unity of purpose among
policy makers with respect to regulatory policy, such that the sources of
disagreement among competing factions do not include the structure of
regulatory decision making, then the process by which regulatory decisions
are made will be stable. Such unity of purpose among policy makers could
arise if division would allow those who could topple the government to
come to power, or if there is a unity of purpose among those to whom the
government is accountable. As long as this unity of purpose holds, we
expect that the regulatory process will be stable.
Suppose, however, that policy makers are divided on the issue of regulatory structure such that each of the competing factions prefers an alternative
to the status quo yet there is disagreernent over which of the alternatives
should be chosen. ln other words, unity of purpose no longer exists. Then,
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for the existing regtIlatoI'y structure to be stable. the competing factions
must he ahle to check each otl1er's proposed changes. That is. :1 system of
separation nli powers‘ must exist, in a divided society, so that competing
lhctions hold a veto over proposed changes in the existing regulatory instinations (Cox and McKelvey I984; Tsebelis 1995). Otherwise, chaos is a
liltely result. Under st'paration oi‘ powers. the deck is stacked in Favor olpreserving the .s‘tal'us quo which allows For regulatory stability.

6. Utility Regulation In Argentina And Chile
in the next two sections, we ttn'n our attention to the speci cs of agenda
tinntrol, veto authority. and political risk and regime stability in Argentina
and Chile. These two countries. with their similar political systems but
dilif'erent regulatory rules and outcomes. present a stark contrast.” One of
the key regulatory diilereiices hctween the two countries is where agenda
power lies: in Chile. the regulators mostly control the agenda; in Argentina,
h_\‘ contrast. the regulators‘ agenda power is quite limited. Argentine regulators may exercise agenda power only at spcci etl intervals and, in fact, they
share agenda authority with producers, distributors, anti even users. ENRE,
the national electricity regulatory hotly in Argentina, can propose new policies unilaterally. For example. only when issuing or renewing licenses. It
must respond. however, to proposals For change (e.g., to alter price-setting
formulas or tariff structures) emanating Fl‘OI‘l1 consumers as well as generators and distributors. Wltile the government's (speci cally. the Secretarfa cle
l".nergt’a's) 20 percent-sl1ai'e in CAMl\/IESA (Compa la Administradora del
Mercado Mayorista lile'ctrico Sociedad Anonirna—the corporation that administers the wholesale electricity market} gives it special veto powers over
decisions taken by CAMMl5SA’s board, it has no more authority to make
proposals in that area than the generators. transmission companies, and
distributors with whom it shares ownership.
This cliilierence in the regulators agenda power can be a stibtle but important factor in investor calculations of expected l‘cturns. To anticipate the
discussion below, in Chile. political risk is minimal. The Constitution
makes it very dill'icult For politicians‘ who want to change the regulatory
regime to succeed and, moreover, the general success ofliheralizing policies
means that those who want to roll them back are in a decided minority. The
regulatory regime itself is quite formal (i.e., speci c about what can he
changed. how much, and under what circumstances), so that while regulators

have a

great

deal of authority

to

propose policy change, they

are very
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limited in the proposals" that they can make. Under these conditions, investors have little to fear from rogue regulators and so should be tintrouhled by
the CNE's agenda attthority.
In Argentina. political risk has decreased, but it is still not eiear whether
the present favoralzlle investment climate is well-entrenched or merely dependent on the whims of Presicieitt Ménem and his economic team (hence
the international as well as. domestic concern over Méncmis sacking of
Economy Minister Cavallo). Under these circumstances, investors have held
on to substantial agenda control, which can serve as added protection
against the policy whims of elected oihcials.
6.1’
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examination of politics and electricity regulation in
and
Chile.
In this section we examine the privatization and conArgentina
of
comitant regulation Argentine electricity. To this end, we first sketch the
extent to which the electricity sector is privatized. We next look at ratesetting rules and processes. The structure of rate setting de nes veto gates,
teversionary outcomes, and agenda control in utility regulation. We then
situate these rules within the larger political context of electoral, legislative,
and constitutional processes. By identi zing who can propose and who can
veto policy change, as well as reversionary policy, we can formulate and test
hypotheses against available data on rates and rate structures.
We now

turn to an
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Privatization and hence regulation of electric utilities in Argentina is a new
phenomenon.” The current system, designed for private enterprise, is
unique in that it divorces utility earnings from their capital—investment
costs. OF further interest, while provisions For rate of return on capital have
been abandoned, the regulatory scheme essentially provides for rate of return on variable costs such as labor, administration and 01'g:1I'li1£21Ei0l'l, fuel,

and so Forth.
The government and the workers of SEGBA (Servieios Eléetrieos del
Gran Buenos Aires) reached an agreement on selling SEGBA (with some
shares going to workers) in September 1989 (Gonzalez Fraga 1991, 95). By
1994, the government had sold majority stakes to three distribution firms,
serving a total of 3,954,353 customers; six transmission C0l'n1J3.l‘IiE!S, aecounting for a total oF 14,971 kilometers oflines; and 21 generating plants,
ranging in capacity from 47 to 1400 megawatts, for a total capacity of
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10.203 meg-.iw:itts. The government held 39 percent of shares For itself‘.
distributed 10 percent to workers, and sold the rest on the stock marltt-t."'
it sold between 5| and 60 percent of generating plant shares on the stoclc
marltet. lteeping between .30 and 47 percent For itself and distributing the
balance to workers in the :ll’li:L‘tCCl plants (ENRE 1994a, 20 and 25, Table
ll). I’ttrchasei's involved in the original sale incltided Chilean
companies as
\vell as companies Froin Fi'ance and Spain (Harmon 1993. ‘)6; Rausch 1993.
185). I’:-ivarizai-ion oiiso many state holdings in just two years
suggests that
investors End the Argeiitine regulatory Formula attractive.

Tm-. iii-‘in-'i.-\'i'ii:N or iii-LNI-‘.iia'i'ioN, 'i‘itai~isMissioN, AND i)is'I‘itIisu'r1oN Electricity
generation. transmission, antl distributioii are regulated under law 24065
and decree l398i"‘)2. As in most countries, there are difterent regulatory
procedures for each of these three aspects of electricity provision.
Hrr‘ii'i'r.t'r_j.r geiieirrrioii is essentially unregulated, with no need For (prospective) generators to obtain permission prior to building or adding to
generating facilities. \X/hen it comes to refiirrg electricity, generators operate in two
marltets: In one, they can contract to sell their output among themselves
and directly to distributors and large consumers, at any price that both
p'.I['T.lt3S can agree to (law 24065, Art. 5).” In the second, they supply energy
at the “spot" price“ on the basis of the marginal cost of
meeting immediate
demand {ENRE 1994a, 59-40).") Generators “also are remunerated For
their available capacity," through a xed, per-megawatt sum that is added
into the spot price (ENRE 1994a, 40].
iE7er!i‘i'ri'ry t'i'riiisiiii3‘.iiwi ritid di'srri'5ii:tioii are classi ed as public services.
Ti'aiismis.sioii companies may not btiy and sell electricity. Like distributors,
they are considered natural geographicaliiioiiopolies and are obliged to
supply access to transmission lines as long as they have capacity to spare. For
which they charge a xed transport fee (see note 22). Distribution companies (but not transmission companies) can buy their energy either directly
from a generator for a contracted price, or they can buy electricity in the
“pi'odticers‘ in-ai‘l<et"m at a three-month “stabilized" spot price intended to
approximate what would prevail in a Free market (ENRE 1994a, 46).“
The national electricity regulating body (Ente N-acional Regtilador de la
l.{lecti-icidad, or ENRE) regulates transmission and distribution companies
and, for the most part, both are covered by the same regulatory provisions.” The transmission and distribution companies control the agenda,
insofar" as they can propose changes to rates, but they also must obtain
permits lrom ENRE in order to build, operate, or extend their facilities (law
2/i[l65, Art. 1]). The process through which such permits are granted is
replete with public hearings and public notice and comment (much like

ii’mli'i.r':'.~'. ilH.~'!i'riirrrni.~'. iiiinl Oii!i‘wivr.r

in

35‘)

rl1:1t provided for in the US Administrative Procedure Act; see law 24065.
Caps. 8 and 9; see also Resolticioii ENRE No. 39514}. Tlicy must also
obtain ENRE approval For mergers. buyouts. or service cutbacks; such approval, like approval of operating licenses. requires a
prooess
public notice, hearing. and comment. The teversionary policy when IINRE
rejects 3 request is the status quo policy (i.e., IENRE holds an ex riiite veto
over regulatory change); should ENRF. Fail to act, neither rejecting not
accepting a request. then policy reverts to the utilityis proposal.

well-de ned

of

L‘:\:L}I~',R ‘tilt. New RIEGIML‘.
While the wholesale electricity market is
largclv unregulated, with prices subject basically to the pressures of supply
and demand, the retail in-.tt'ltet is not. Distributors operate regional monopolies uiider ve—year licenses from ENRE and, therefore. d0 HOE £155
market competition. The licenses stipulate zt tarifl structure, which then
serves as the basis for all price adjustments.
‘
agreed to at
The reversionary pricing policy, then, is the initial tariffs
of criteria
beginning of’ the licensing period. adjusted according to a
set forth in the electricity law. As circumstances and technologies are not
constant, distributors may request adjustnieiits to the initial structure.
t],c,eby conrrgllinrrU the agenda over price changes. Such requests must be
approved by ENRE, which holds veto authority over them. Rate-change
requests are subject to challenge on several Fronts (law 24065, Art. 45;
Resoluciijn ENRE No. 39.04); ENRE, may call hearings
rate adjust. .
.
_
tin
‘
are
rates
U ffa
that
s
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it
if
unjust,
company
believes
merits, for example,
sonable, tinjusti ably discrirriinatoty, 01‘ ptcfetelltlaln (Law 24065: Aft» 43:
and see Resolucion ENRIC No. 39394). Iii r/ie eiteiii‘ afENRE riirrctiiiiri (i.e.,
no rrii’i'iig iuiiiiiii 120 diys), trite lfeeiisee riiriy iriiiiriire its reqiieired cfmrrges as if
ring: bird i ?-:’£’J1 rippi'oura’.” Thus, the distribution companies control, to some
extent, the reversionary policy. Together with their control over the agenda,
the regulatory process should seem quite attractive to investors, as it is
predictable and controllable. If the initial tariffs in the contract are favorable, then investors should be quite happy to commit their resources.
In many countries, including such disparate cases as ]apan,_the United
States and Mexico utility prices are regulated so that residential users are
charged a lower rate than other types of users. Prices t tl‘1lS‘Cl(‘.’5C1‘lptl0n in
Argentina when its electric utilities were state—owned enterprises. Moreover,
Prior to privatization, prices were often unpredictable {Covarrubios and
Maia 1994-.1), particularly for commercial users, and the tariff Stf11CtUl’€
to pay less
favored residential consumers. As a general rule, industry
consumers,
due
both
elastic de~
to
its
relatively
other
than
for electricity
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lor iiitliistry tends to be cheaper to deliver because it comes in larger quantities and at higher tension. lfprices reflect cost of delivery, then the ratio of
i-esideiitial to industry prices, at any time, should be greater than 1. As can
be seen in Table l. before privatization in 1989-90, the ratio of residential
to iiitliisrrial prices was in fact above unity. Table [ also shows that,
prior to
priv.n'i'r..-ition, low-demand residential users wci'e charged Far less than high
rleniand residents. cominercial users and small iiidustry.
In the leadup to privatir.ation, however, prices were adjusted. Wllile commercial users were still charged more than any other class of coiisurners, by
1991. low and high demand residential users were facing roughly equal
prices and small and large industry both saw signi cant price drops. These
changes more than doubled SEGBA’s total average tariff from spring 1990
to spring 1992 (Covarrubios and Maia 19‘)-4b, A-40, Table II). This doubling in the total average tariFF, given the increase in electricity consumption
overall (see Table II), implies that the utility’s revenues increased greatly and
that utilities were increasing capacity to ful ll previously unmet demand.“
The increase in pi'iees For residential consumers is a non-trivial change with
respect to revenue for the utilities, since residential consumption is both
inelastic and accounts for nearly 50% of overall electricity sales (see Table
Ill}. We also see evidence of increasing pro tability For Argentine electric
utilities. For example. consider EDENOR, the electricity distribution cornpany for the northern region of Argentina. EDENOR’s balance sheet reported net losses in 1992 and 1993 but they have begun to turn it around
with net gains in both 1994 and 1995 (see Table lV).25 This increase in
profitability is attractive to investors, particularly if they are convinced that
the existing regulatory structure is sustainable. In fact, the utility's agenda
setting role with respect to policy change offers the investor con dence in
regulatory sustainability, and thus gives rise to regulatory predictability.
The regulatory regime that was created For privatized electric utilities
privileges status—quo tarif s. Private utilities, under this new structure, retain
monopoly proposal power for changes in regulatory policy. Rational utili‘l'i\Bl.|i [
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ties‘ thc1.cf0l.C_ will only make proposals For policy change when it will
of return than the status quo. The regulatory process.
guarantee higher rites
‘
and
open challenges, essentially gives C0l1‘lpi1l1l(‘.“i J. W.‘ 0
replete with hearings
thus
makes regulatory policy predictable. Hence, by
Over new PO[ic\- and
adlustrng prices before piiv.1tir.ation in order to rn.1l<c SECBA pio tab e
in
bv credibly com:-nittino1'3 to a regulatory structure that stacks the deck
.
of
the
preservation
favor of the status quo, the government guaranteed
tariffs that were Favorable to investment. The new pricing structure was
Credible as Eong as the regulations underpinning it were seen as stable. This
is the mpic to which we next turn.
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utilities
would
be

conThe new regime in Argentina is attractive to investors because
trol tin. agenda O\!C]' proposed tari f changes and because the reversionary
.
.
.
price structure was set up to be pro table. But why
investors 1'ieve
Eh,“ the m,,u]1mn. regime is credible? After all, Argentine politics in the
nvemieth C:mm.); have been typi ed by intense, often violent, class and
urban-rural con ict. The provinces‘ strong voice in politics _l1‘13%“1 ‘3‘_1
con icr, Further, political leadcis usually have Faced both
military and an opposition that sought radical economic re istri utio
Political control was particularly desirable because the state owned key
sectors of the Argentine economy. State ownership of public utilities Was
one of the Few things that Radical party politicians and Peronists agreed on.
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\Xr’liatever the basis For this agi'eenient——economic philosophy, nationalism,
political experieiice, ide0l0gy———it effectively opened the coffers of stateowned enterprises to the party in power. As a result, politicians in
power
have sought two things above all else: to eliminate the opposition and.to
extract as much as they could from the economy before
they themselves
were reiiiovcd From of ce.
Ftir most of the 20th century. Argentina's governments have been
uni ed.
either under Peronist. Radicali"Consei'vative. or military control.
During
their tenure in oF ce. each had opportunities to unilaterally impose its own
policies. But, the separation of powers system in Argentina allows For the
division of purpose within the society to yield divided government. Indeed,
in the 1980s, President Alfonsin Faced a divided legislature. Divided
government, iti this instance, seemed destined to follow
the same pattern of
policy stalemate and political upheaval as in the past, but it did not. The
violence of the past caused the parties to compromise in this case: Alfoiisin
striictured a compromise between the moderate factions within both
his
own Peroiiist Party and the Radicals who held the legislature. It
was under
these conditioiis that privatization was possible (Hill and Abdala 1996).
The 1988 elections brought uni ed government back in under the Petonist Partido justicialista (Pl) (Jones forthcoming). but the newly
elected
l’ei'oiIist president. Meneni. and other moderate Peronists proved willing to
\V(J|'l( with moderates in the
Radicali"Conservative party even against the
wishes of their more extreme copartisans. Witli the military on the sidelines
and the public sector in shambles, control of government was
both less
tenuous and less pro table than in the past. Thus, while there are
still some
risks of investing in Argentina relative to investments in other developing
countries. the new political environment and new regulatory regime reduced the risks in the near term, malting investment more attractive and
pi'ivatizatioi1 Feasible.
Indeed. the new political climate is reflected in the setting of electricity
tiiritiis. Table V provides a representative glance at electricity rates For different user categories from the moment of privatization
to April 1994.26 This
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thus. gave liie to con.-;tiuIl'ionaI (.'l‘lCCi(.S. This makes all policy change. and
particularly change that runs roughshod over all opposition. much more
di icult.
\5i/hat do these recent changes mean in terms of investment and prices?
W‘ argue that willingness to invest is a function of reversionaty policy plus
the inreraaion or regulations, regulatory processes. and political stability. In
r\rge|1tiIta. there are three distinct periods ofinterest with respect to investment and regulatory pi‘ices—pte-I992. 1992-1994, and post—l‘)94-——corresponding to hours of: privatization and of constitutional revision. Witll respect to pricing, we should observe tl1at utiiity pricing prior to 1992 should
follow a political logic, not an econotnic one. While we do not pretend to
analyze policy makers" incentives we do expect prices to be erratic during
this period, with unpredictable changes as political circumstances change,
and for the tariFFstructure to Favor the constituents to whom the politicians
are electorally accountable. Table VI presents average tariff Ievels For residential. commercial and industrial users of electricity For April and October,
l‘_)88——]‘)‘)]. These data show considerable price instability. The data
presented in Table I also support the latter contention, showing that the ratio
of‘ prices Favored certain user groups over others.
We would also have expected prices to then stabilize in 1992 For two
reasons. First, the government sought to create an initial tariff to encourage
investment upon the initiation of privatization. Second, the utilities under
the new regulatory structure retained monopoly proposal power for changes
'
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from the initial tariff‘. Indeed. as Table VI indicates. prices stabilize in 1992
for all three user categories. Table V oiiiers evidence-that tariffs were stable
between 1995 and I994.
Investment should be lower where price risk and political uncertainty are
high (i.e.. an adequate return is uncertain), all else constant. Thus, we
‘should observe that private investment should have increased lroin 1992 to
the present. Figure 2 shows that installed capacity has increased For at least
the years in which we have data (installed capacity is a reasonable proxy for
investment in generating equipment). Furthermore, utilities will shy away
from major investments if they Fear that they won't be aliowed to recoup
their costs. much less earn a pro t. This implies, For example, that in a
situation of political uncertainty, distributors will invest relatively more
heavily in variable inputs for maintaining the existing grid instead of investing capital to upgrade or extend it. This is a testable proposition, although
we do not have the data to check it. Ifwe did, we would expect to observe
a clear increase in capital investment by distribution companies in the wake
of the 1994 constitutional revisions and their confirmation by the public
with the peaceful reelection of President Ménem. Generators, as we have
shown in Figure 2, also increased their investments as their future became
more secure.”
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I-"iii-ally, the higher are utility prices, the more attractive it is For large
and instead generate their own power.
prices high enough that self-generation is
an attractive alternative, sell*'—generation should be Fairly common. We
note
in this regard that, in the absence of the political stabilization we identify
with constitutional amendments and Ment:m's reelection, self-generated
electricity in Argentina was projected to rise From some 3400 GWI1 in
I99] to 5480 in the year 2000 (Covarrubios
and Maia 1994b. A-42,
liigure ,7}. ln the more certain political climate that prevails today, in—
creased capital investment should improve economies of scale and hence
prices, and future estimates of self-generation should decline. indeed, it
has. as the development of new self-generation capacity has recently
tlroppetl to near zero, while co—gener-.1tion has increased to take advantage
oi" the more tvorable pricing S[I'|.l(.‘tul'C.Z8 Moreover, during the period
l'i'om 1991 through I994, the number of self-generators dropped From
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users to opt out oi the system
When an uncertain market lteeps

1339 to 1601.3‘-’

6.2 il:'fr=t‘z:'r'ci{y ltegirfzrtfrrrr aim’ Regtrlrrtoiy Out.=.'ome.t in Chile
Tlirotigliotit most ol" the 20th century in Argentina, frequent military coups
and suspended constitutional processes led to increased political uncertainty
and economic rislts. Only recently has the winner—tal<.e-all quality of Argentine politics been seemingly overtaken by a spirit of compromise. The military coup of Pinochet in 1973 overturned an admirable history of democratic politics. This led to a host of societal problems, including both civil
unrest and human rights violations. Rather than inject an added measure
of‘
uncertainty to economic decision making, however, the legacy of Chile's
nearly two decades oF dictatorship is a high degree of stability in both the
political regime and in regulatory policy.
Prior to pt'ivativ.arion, Argentina set up a pro table reversion For electric
utility regulation and then set up a regulatory system that was predictable
and. indeed, Favorable to utilities. As discussed above, political and institutional changes served to reinforce this structure. Similarly, Pinochet set up a
pt'oI'itable reversion and predictable utility regulation process. This structure
in Chile Favored utility pro t motives.” Evidence of Favorable conditions
For investment is revealed in Table VII, as we observe a change in prices that
we can trace to early in Pinocl1et’s regime. Table VII shows an increase in
the average annual tarill’, For both residential and large industry consumers,
when comparing an early ve year period of Pinochet’s regime with the last
ve year period of his tenure, after his new regulatory structure was given a
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chance to settle ins“ Also note that, as expected, Chile’s largest electric
power supply company, ENDESA, has been quite pro table over the same
period (see Table Vlll).'3‘i' Moreover, constitI.ttion:1l change, making changes
in the regulatory regime sustainable in the short run, allowed for more
stable policies than we might otherwise predict. We now l:ttt‘I1 to examine
the underpinnings of this stability in the context of Chilean electricity
regulation.
As in Argentina. the electricity sector it1 Chile is regulated by a single
bocly—-——tl1e National Energy Commission (CNE). Guidelines for electricity
regulation are spelled out in fine detail in Ministry of Mines Decree 1, 1932
(as amended by Law 18.922, 1990). Also as in Argentina, certain classes of
service are unregulated. In general, prices may be freely contracted for large
users (over 2000 kW}, short—term service {less than twelve months), and
users with special service requirements (DFL 1, Art.90).
Wlrilc the law regulating electricity generation and distribution explicitly
leaves certain classes of service uruegulated. it nonetheless links regulated
and nonrcgulatcd prices. Decree ], 1982, stipulates that the prices set by the
T.v\l"-LIE
‘hm:
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CNE “inay not diller by more than it} percent from contracted prices" in
the nonregulated market (law 24065. Art. 101). This clause ties the two
classes of priccs—I‘egI.Ilatcd and unregulated—together and carries with it
the potential to set up a rather interesting incentive structure for utility
investment

strategies.

In its rare—setting role. the CNE—again. like its Argentine counterpart——is supposed to talte into account the real costs of producing. transmitting. and distributing electricity. To this end, it sets maximum allowable rates that are supposed to reflect the long-run marginal costs of
operations (Spiller and Martorell 1994, 36; Silva 1991, 25). The result is
intended to approximate prices and pro ts under a competitive market.
not the rare-of-retui'n regulation used prior to 1980 (Spiller and Martorell
I994, 30].

6. 2. 1"
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rate-setting procedures make rate setting predictable. Where ENRE.
in Argcmina must respond to all complaints and, often. hold public hearings. less is required oi? the CINE. In some cases, as when generating cornpanies register complaints abotit what they see as unfair regulated rates.
(NE is under no obligatitm to take any action at all (so
long as regulated
rates are within 10 percent or‘ unregulated rates-—DFL 1, 1982, Art. 101).
in those cases where a response is required, the manner and degree of the
response is spelled out in the law. This makes rate setting transparent and,
along with the Fact that costs are calculated on the basis of long—terrn invesunents (DFL I, 1982, Art. 105], gives companies an incentive to invest
in eilicient and durable physical plants.
Prices at the distribution end of the electricity pipeline are set on the basis
of‘ wholesale, or “node" prices plus value added in distribution. Node prices
for electricity are set twice yearly to “re ect an average of the marginal costs
ol‘ supply incurred in generation and transmission" (DFL 1, 1982, Art.
‘)7).'l‘l To the extent that capital costs are factored into this calculation, they
are aggregated and averaged across all generating and transmitting companies. Company-specific capital costs are not included in the calculation of
distribution value added. They are determined, along with administrative
and operating costs, on the basis of a "model company” whose characteristics are de ned by the CNE (DFL I, 1982, Art. 106). In short, distributors
(except. perh_aps. CHILECTRA as discussed below) have little direct conttol
over prices. Wliile they are assured of recouping their cost of‘ buying electricity on the wholesale market, they have no such assurance with respect to
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returns on their capital investments. For that, they need to invest as efficiently as possible, in order to keep their own costs in line with those of the
CNE's "l‘l'IOLl.Cl“ company.'l'i
In de ning the tariff-influencing characteristics oi’ a “model" company,
and hence the costs that utilities may recoup through tariffs. the CNE
divides companies into three classes: "Low density" (of which there are
seven} companies. with Fewer than twenty thousand customers; “medium
density" (seventeen) companies, with between twenty thousand and one
million customers; and “high density" (one—-—CHILECTRA, a publicly
owned integrated company) companies that serve over one million users
(Spiller and Martorell. 52). “Model" costs are set separately for each class of
company, and how closely they approximate costs for companies in a competitive market depends on how accurate ai'e the CNE's calculations, which
depend crucially on how competitive the market actually is. As the best
source of information on company costs is the companies themselves. estimated costs for medium—density companies should be fairly accurate, costs
For low—clensity companies should be somewhat less accurate, and costs For
the single high-density company ought to be overestimated.
As noted above, regulated wholesale prices are set to re ect generating
companies‘ long-run marginal costs. The twist to this scheme is that CNEdetermined node prices “cannot diverge by more than 10 percent from
prices [For equivalent tension and power levels] not subject to price regulation" (DFL 1, 1982, Art. 101]. The intent here is to ensure that nodal prices
do not diverge too much from market prices. If generators can use regulated
prices as a focal point For collusion, however, this creates an interesting
incentive problem with regard to whether to sell their output in the unregulated or the regulated market: The problem is, the existence of the regulated
market could take the competitive pressure out of the unregulated market.
As in any free market, the Fewer companies that compete in the unregulated
market, all else constant. the higher will be the unregulated price and,
therefore, the regulated price as well. A company that does not enter into
the unregulated market is not, however, denied the ability to sell its product.
On the contrary, it can then sell its output on the regulated market at
gmtnrnrecd prices. Hence, collusive. cartel-iilte behavior would be rewarded
through higher prices on the regulated market.
There is in Fact no xed reversionary tariff in Chile, although the reversionary tariff is predictable and depends on market forces or, absent a competitive market, on well-de ned formulas For approximating a market. The
reversion is essentially whatever the market will bear, and rms that allocate
investment inell'iciently will see their profits drop as a result. To the extent
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that the regttlatory forlttulas are well-designed, then, electricity pricing
should contribute to more Ci"-l'iCiL’I'It econotnic development in general.
(i...’.,.’
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On the one hanrl, then. investment capital should have gravitated toward
Ciliilei.-; electric utilities. liurther, as such investment would have been channeled into efficient generation and transmission facilities; Chile should have
seen an impressive increase in installed capacity over the same period. On
the other hand, to the degree that generators operate in uncompetitive
niarl<ets {clue to market structure or to collusion), and to the degree that
Cl-*ll[.F(ITRA acts as a monopolist is in the single largest market in Chile,
electricity prices should have held steady or at least dropped far less than
might be expected given the increase in installed capacity. As a result, electricity generation should be highly pro table in spite of the CNE's continuing efforts to set tariff rates equal to long-term marginal costs and, therefore,
luring profits down to minimal levels.
.
\‘€*’|iat we observe in Chile meets our expectations. As can be seen in Table
IX, the amount of electricity generated in Chile has risen steadily, with
prices changing little throughout the 19805, as seen in Table Vlll. Further,
electricity self-generation has continued to rise since privatization (see
Spiller and Martorell 19.94, 41, Tables B:Vl and B:\/II). This suggests that
prices still are high enough to make it worthwhile for relatively inefficient
producers to continue generating electricity rather than buying it off the

grid.

Chile’s electricity regulatory system has sparked new investment.The question is, what are the chances that this particular regulated system will last?

'I"hrougl1out Pinoehet’s regime (1973-89), Chile’s government focused
liherali7.ation and political stability. By the time Pinochet left
power, the electricity sector was just one of many segments of the economy
that had been privatized and opened up to market forces. In essence, the
free market became the reversionary policy, which we will argue next is
wcll—protectctl by the Constitution that Pinochet introduced in 1980.
on economic
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Chileis Constitution privileges the status—qI.1o policy. Chile has a separation
of powers system with a bicameral legislature, like Argentina. with each
chamber possessing a veto over policy. Rules that skew representation in
favor of conservative, rural areas, and a two-member district system that

TABLE IX

Electricity Generation. Chile (tl1ousantl.s of k\l'i"I1)
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gives a strong boost to the second-strongest party in a district virtually
guarantee that the policies put in place under Pinochet always have the
ability to veto changes to those policies. Not only is it difficult for a single
partyto win more than 50 percent oflower-house seats (see Caviedes 1991;
Godoy Arcaya 1994), a constitutional provision (Const. Art. 45) for appointed (eight-year terms) and lifetime senators has thus far denied a senate
majority to Pinochet’s old antagonists.3'5
As a result. it would be very diflicult for a government that sought to
reverse policies enacted under Pinochet's rule to do so. Unless Concertacion
lists and candidates begin to win by overwhelming majorities in the bulk of
the country, their opposition will likely always hold a powerful check. And
even if the Concettacion were to sweep aside its opponents, it remains in
effect a coalition of parties with distinct policy goals (see especially, Drake
1993, 4; Auth 1994, 347). As it stands now, the present governing coalition——onetime opponents of Pinochet and, it was presumed, all he stood
for—stands in support of economic liberalism and the economic model
promoted by Pinochet's regime (Godoy Arcay , 305).
Drastic changes in regulatory policy or goals, therefore, are unlikely in
Chile. Those who might oppose current policies cannot expect to control all
the various segments of the policy making pt‘ocess, so they cannot expect to
change policy. Moreover, if 1993 electoral outcomes are any indication,
voters approve of the Iiberalizing bent of the current government. Perhaps
more to the point, Pinochet and the military returned to the barracks, but
they still pose :1 tacit threat to all who might consider signi cantly changing
the status quo. This situation will remain unchanged until 1997, when the
balance of power in the Senate may shift as a result of the appointment of
eight new members by the president.
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7. Conclusion
Chileis success in privatiating the electricity sector (and other utilities, such
telecommunications) has been seen as a victory For institutional engineering. Chilcis privatized electricity sector seems to have developed steadily and
healthily over time, while Argentina's development looks much more erratic. Now that Argentina has privatized electric utilities, the question arises
as to whether its development will begin to parallel that of Chile.
Spiller and
Martorell (1994) argue that it will not, because Chile has had the time to
develop calmly, with “strong political support For maintaining the nancial
viability of the companies," an opportunity denied Argentina. Further. electricity regulation in Chile is decentralized, while in Argentina it remains
centralized in the federal government (Spiller and Martorell 1994, 49).
There is tmdouhtetlly muc.h truth to this view. The level of regulatory
risk. after all, is tightly linked to the ease with which regulatory procedures
allow t‘egulatot‘s to Force utilities to reallocate the incidence oficharges. for
example. We have argued here, however, that investment strategies look to
-.1 much more basic source of risk: regime instability.
While this has been
only a distant concern in Chile, it has been an urgent concern in Argen—
tina. But. the Future may bring changes. We contend that constitutional
rdorm has transformed Argentine politics to some extent, providing a
Foundation For pro table enterprise comparable to that built up over many
years in Chile. By contrast. changes in the makeup of the Chilean Senate
could constitute a shift in its policy preferences, as we expect the new
appointees to be either part of the president's party or at least members of
a party other than the Conservatives. In Argentina, now that the constitutional incentives lead to compromise and not confrontation (and the mili—
tary threat is but a pale caricature of what it once was; see, e.g., Calvin
Sims. “Argentine Military for Rent; Turns Swords into Tin Cups," T/re
fV(’if.£’ lfml’ Firiies. January 29. I996. AI),
investors and rms can look
lthrwarcl to :1 more Favorable Future.
The task for any government that wishes to privatize its utilities is to
establish a reguiatory structure that is both favorable to private investment
and sustainable without sacri cing service. Private entities must be satis ed
that the political risk ofinvesting in regulated utilities is counterbalanced by
a suFl'iciently tempting expected rate of‘ return. IF, however, the rate of return
is not exorbitantly high, then cautious investors must be convinced that a
more conservative rate of return is politically sustainable. Our theory of
privatimtion and political risk establishes that regulatory predictability and
regime stability are two conditions that encourage private investment in
public utilities. \3(/hen a government and its regulatory structure meet these
as
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conditions, private investors can reasonably conclude that the commitment
to the process is credible. Evidence from Argentina and
Chile. as presented
here. indicates that these conditions are, in Fact, critical to the economic
growth of key sectors within developing nations.
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Endiietes
1. I’olitic:tl meclclling and economic

inef ciencies are not con ned to low-and middleincome economies. In developed economies, government regulation of utilities is used
essentially as inefhcient tax policy.
The first 0|‘ these problems is essentially inescapable and not necessarily 0lJjE‘:C|IiOl‘t.'Il)lC.
Government intervention to supply demands not met by the market can be justified on
grounds other than economic (e.g., moral), just as it is well-recognized that market
Forces will tend to undersupply important collective goods (Olson I965). Levy and
Spiller (1994. 204) put it succinctly: “\"l1idespreacl domestic consumption implies that
the pricing of utilities is always going to be political."
5. on the politics of utility regulation, see Noll (197la, 197113, 1985, I989}, Iosltow
(1974). Joskow and Noll (I981), Joskovv and Schmalensee (1983), and Noll and Owen
!-J

ll)‘

38-‘I

(1933).

_iHt'r

ll.’ fa‘. .I’i"r'filt‘:' .r:rri’i‘li'. 1’). .'lilr'(_}r{;i"rm.\'

}’tiil.I'!rt'5. ilir_trr'.rttr.*}H.'s.

Tlris could include excliange rate risk, capital asset accounting risk, and all forms or‘
regtilatory risk.
We define “extreitit*’i here as a point strf cienrly Far from all the veto players‘ ideal
points.
I-"or -.1 (liscttssion ol" the Sl1:tt'pe-Lirrtrier capital asset pricing model. see Milgroin and
Rolrcrls (I992: “lb/l—4()7}.
Levy antl Spiller (I994. 205 and ii.) use the

terms “regulatory goverrrance" and "regul.Itt1t'}' incentives" to reler to tire same essential issues.
{Ionr-crselv. where either the "esecut'ive has strong legislative powers" or the legislature
has tight control over the citccutivc. credibility sltotrld be more scarce (Levy and Spiller

i994. i‘.(l7l'.

Stable policies or processes, however. do not tlecessarily encourage investment. Current
polit.'_\'n1:t_\'bt? dillicult to clrangc but averse to investment. Therefore, the investors must
L‘\':1ll.I'.ttt' the degree to which the reversionary policy suits their goals for rate of return.
ll}. Set‘. lirr c>:.imple, Eitelow' :-incl Hinich 1984.
ll. R coirld. of course. rnaltc a proposal between Iand y. expecting 1 to approve it; however.
if‘R is a wcllirre—n1aximizing actor. then it would be irrational to proposcanything to the
lcli til‘ v.
. Alternatively, the utility can be made worse ofiiin the reversionary outcome moves from
Q‘ [0 Q L-.._-cause |I——y‘ at lI—_v| and the equilibrium outcome under the new reversion.

Q. is _t'.

l is the equilihriuin outcome in Figure lib) when the utility is the agenda setter.
i'eg:ii'dir:ss of‘ whether iltt.‘ rcgtilator has a veto.
lfi. The ctmtr-ast stems titrrn the mirroring principle (McCubbins, Noll, and _\X/eingast
I98‘). 444}. Ar'gentina’s regulatory regime. open to participation (and to conflict)
all

on
the

sides. rel'lects Argerrtine politics as that country works to shake off its
political
past. Anti Chile's regulatory regime. insulated from politics and largely
From
tree
need to resporid to conflict. rellects l’inochet's position and power at the time er’ legis1'-tri'ei'set it into law.
15. The process began in 1989, but the first sales took place in 1992.
‘
16. (Jne transmission firm, Ttanscomaliiic, was bought by the provincial-government irrnis
I".i’i.:.i\l anti lil{Si.:..
Note that the rules governing itnpleincntatioii of the electricity prohibit Uwnff Oi
generating facilities Front holding licenses to distribute electricity (decree 1398i"‘)2.

turbttlent

_

'

Tlrlegiptit price is calculated hotrrly by the Coinpafila Administradora del Mercado
M-ayorist-.I [ilcctrico Societlztd Ai‘tt’)nima (CAl\iiMl:.5.‘lt).
in periods oi’ high deniancl,
"spot" price will be much greater than the
production cost til: the most ef'cient pro ucers.
. A producer's market is a “spor" market where the price is calculated by a company
dedicated only to that taslc (e.g.. in Argentina, CAMMESA).
. This price combines long—term estimates of the output of the most ecottotnical production techriology (over the long term} available (i.e.. hydroelectric). Wc’(:l(ly_€Stlr1'IL1tC5I0l"
the prtib-.rbility ofhreakdowns and the concomitant costs oferisuring SLll: CI_t'.‘f1l"C'apaCl[)’
to ittaiittain utiinter'rnpted supply, and daily calcttl-ation—given inptrt availability (for
t,‘}{.'tI11[‘rlt.‘. ltydmelcctr'ic getreraiitm grows more expensivedurirtg dry spells)--oftlie most
cllicient type ofgencratot. Decisions as to the standard lot an efficient generator. as Well
as estimates of future demand and probability of breakdowns. are made by the regulatory body. leaving quite a bit ol: leeway For the “spot” price to differ from what wotrld be
the free-marl-tet pricc.
22. Unless otherwise specified. we shall refer generically to distribution compan res cover
to
both aspects of supply. We Focus rnainiy on distribtitiori,
regulation of
not
tr-airsiriission companies is transparent or uniriteresting——-it is not-——but because

tltfgrelote. tit:

_

because
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transmission-speci c regulations are in a dillerent category from distribution. in any
case. the‘ fixed transmission prices are liactored into retail prices straightforwardly.

This only gives the licensee partial control over the reversion lrccattse. should ENRE
later reiect the requested change. the licensee mtrst return to the old rate structure and
reimburse customers For -.1ny diflercnce in payments (Law 24065, Art. 47). How this
plays out. however, is as yet unclear. Tlierciore. industry's role in agenda setting remains
a polt‘i‘it tool liar iin't-stors to help ensure the preservation of prolitable
regulatory
structures.

As or‘ 1991. average revenue for electricity (total sales divided by total sales in Gwh) was

only 79 percent of average nancial cost. de ned as total operating cost. plus payments
on debt interest and principal. minus depreciation, divided by total sales in Gwh (Campos and Esfahani 1994, Table lib).
The losses in the first couple of years after privatization can be attributed to the enorrnous irref ciericy of the st-.tte—run companies, which the private owners inherited.
. The table shows the tarifl structure For EIJENOR S./'i.. one oF the three regionalrnorropoly distribution cotnp.-inies that were created front Sl:1GBA's distribution network. The other two. which have similar tariff structures, are EDESUR S.A.. and
l‘:l_)E-l..flLl) S.A. More recent ENRE data. supplied by Hanna Robles,
con rm that this
trend has continued into early 1996.
The situation For trarisport companies is murkicr. as they remain heavily regulated and
are permitted to invest only on request from electricity generators or buyers (we
thank
l--lanna Robles of ENRE For this clarifying observation).
As noted in a personal communication with Felix I'Ielou, legal advisor on economic
regulation at ENRE. Also. see http:i'i'vvww.inecori.arilenergiai"erierg__anuario/zip!’
tapa.hrm which contains “INFORME DEL SECTOR ELECTRICO" ofthe SUBSECRETARIA DE ENERGIA. Direccion Nacional dc Protspectiva, MINISTERJO DE
ECONOMIA Y OBRAS Y SERVICIOS PUBL]COS SECRETAIUA DE ENERGIA,
TRANSPORTE Y COMUNICACIONES. Republic of Argentina.
29. See littp:.*'i"\-vrv\v.irrecoii.artenergiafenerg_anuariofzipJ'tapa.l1tm
30. it is interesting to note that Pinochet, while raising tariffs to encourage private investment, continued to Favor the agriculture sector with moderate, consistent
prices. This is
unsurprising, since the agriculture sector is a key supporter of his regime.
In 1981. electricity prices were higher tltall the average price for the rest of the 1980s.
\\'-’e attribute this to the economic volatility and political uncertainty that marked the
time at the beginning of‘I’iriochet's rise to power.
52. The dip into unpro tability in 1985 coincides with bad economic times in general.
33. Node prices "are computed using indexing Formulae that depend on Fuel costs. equipment costs. dam levels. exchange rate, and so on" (Spiller and
Martorell 1994, 37).
. The CNE-dc ried "model" company represents a “typical,” ef cierit rm. Existing distribution and transmission companies can challenge the CNE.'s estimates, however
(DFL I. 1982. Art. 107). \1(/hen challenged. the CNE iriay accede
to tire utilities’
estimates of costs; if not, then tl"tt‘_' characteristics ofa "n1oclel” company are calculated as
a weighted average of CNE and industry gures. This rule gives electric utilities as
a
group a fair amount of indirect authority to set their own rates.
35. Pinochet's government appointed its own sirpporters to the Senate positioiis. In the
1939 elections that preceded i’inochet's Witllt.lI'tlW:ll from the Forefront of politics, the
opposition Ctrncertacitfrri won about 58 percent of the elected seats in both the House
of Deputies and the Senate. it vvas able to occupy only 47 percent oi Senate seats,
however, because of the designated senators. in 1993. Concertacion parties jointly won
about 55 percent of elected Senate seats, but only 46 percent of total Senate seats. The
Concertacit3n's share of the popular vote in 1939 and 199.3 was 52.1 and 55.5 percent,
respectively (Atrth 1994. 347).

